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Abstract:  
It is a commonly expressed sentiment that the science and philosophy of well-being would 
do well to learn from each other. Typically such calls identify mistakes and bad practices on 
both sides that would be remedied if scientists picked the right bit of philosophy and 
philosophers picked the right bit of science. We argue that the differences between 
philosophers and scientists thinking about well-being are more difficult to reconcile than such 
calls suggest, and that pluralism is central to this task. Pluralism is a stance that explicitly 
drives towards accommodating and nurturing the richness and diversity of well-being, both 
as a concept and as an object of inquiry. We show that well-being science manifests a 
contingent pluralism at the level of methodology, whereas philosophy of well-being has 
largely rejected pluralism at the conceptual level. Recently, things have begun to change. 
Within philosophy, conceptual monism is under attack. But so is methodological pluralism 
within science. We welcome the first development, and bemoan the second. We argue that a 
joined-up philosophy and science of well-being should recognise the virtues of both 
conceptual and methodological pluralism. Philosophers should embrace the methodological 
justification of pluralism that can be found in the well-being sciences, and scientists should 
embrace the conceptual reasons to be pluralist that can be found in philosophical debate. 
1 Introduction 
The idea that the science and philosophy of well-being would do well to learn from each other 
is well rehearsed. Recent calls for more interaction between the two fields emphasise the 
inevitable normative assumptions involved in defining and measuring well-being in the well-
being sciences, and the dependence of philosophical theories of well-being on empirical facts 
about ordinary linguistic usage and psychology (Angner 2013; Bishop 2015; Prinzing 2020). 
These calls list mistakes and bad practices on both sides that would be remedied if scientists 
picked the right bit of philosophy and philosophers picked the right bit of science. Although 
welcome, this does not get to the heart of the issue, because the differences between 
philosophers and scientists thinking about well-being run deeper. 
 
In this paper, we argue that a genuinely joined-up philosophy and science of well-being needs 
to embrace pluralism. Tendencies towards conceptual and methodological monism in well-
being scholarship, which are clearly visible in the rising prominence and application of the 
construct of life-satisfaction, are, we argue, worrying and misguided. Our concerns are not 
merely academic—constructs and measures of well-being are increasingly used as a decision-
making tool in healthcare and public policy, and the consequences of using tools which fail to 
take seriously the conceptual complexity and epistemic uncertainty of well-being and its 
measurement have the potential to be widespread and grave. 
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Section 2 illustrates monism, first in science and then in philosophy. Contemporary well-being 
sciences adopt many different and often conflicting ways of defining and measuring well-being 
and in this sense manifest methodological pluralism. However, the landscape is changing. 
Within science, certain approaches to well-being, most notably life satisfaction, are starting to 
dominate the field. The enticing practical appeal of such approaches—they produce easy to 
work with quantitative data that—threatens the prevailing, but fragile, pluralism. Philosophers 
of well-being, on the other hand, have tended to adopt a principled, anti-pluralistic stance in a 
search for the one true theory or definition of well-being. This monism in philosophy is, 
however, under attack, with defences of conceptually pluralist theories of well-being offered in 
its place.  
 
We welcome the second development but condemn the first. Section 3 formulates distinct 
versions pluralism as they would look given the aims of science and of philosophy respectively. 
Monistic approaches are tempting for their simplicity and usability, but their prevalence will 
ultimately undermine the goals of well-being sciences. We argue that this field would do well 
to preserve and to nurture a pluralist outlook. There are also good conceptual reasons for 
philosophers of well-being to adopt a pluralist stance. Section 4 defends each version of 
pluralism by showing that pressures towards monism harm epistemic goals in both science 
and philosophy. A joined-up philosophy and science of well-being should recognise the virtues 
of both methodological and conceptual pluralism. Philosophers should embrace the 
methodological justification of pluralism that can be found in well-being science, and scientists 
should embrace the conceptual reasons to be pluralist that can be found in philosophy. 
2 Monism today 
We use the term ‘monism’ to pick out ideas that reject one or another aspect of pluralism. In 
this section we show these ideas at work in empirical well-being research and then in 
philosophy. 
2.1 Monism in science: A fragile pluralism under pressure 
The empirical science of well-being is an interdisciplinary and multilevel field, spanning 
psychology, economics, sociology, geography and anthropology. So contemporary methods 
and approaches to well-being reflect the diversity of disciplines in social sciences. Its methods 
include experiments, surveys, ethnographies, interviews, and statistical analysis. This 
diversity is also visible in the many different definitions of well-being different researchers 
adopt and different measures that they devise to capture these definitions. Table 1 
summarises what we see as the main traditions: 
Table 1: Definitions and measures of well-being in current social and medical sciences.1 
Definition Measure 
 
1 This table is an abbreviated version. For a full version, references, and explanation of each row see 
Alexandrova 2017. 
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Happiness Experience Sampling, U-Index, Positive and 
Negative Affect Scale, SPANE, Subjective 
Happiness Scale, Affect Intensity measures 
Life Satisfaction Satisfaction with Life Scale, Cantril Ladder, 
Domain Satisfaction 
Flourishing PERMA, Psychological Well-being Index, 
Flourishing Scale, Warwick and Edinburgh 
Mental Wellbeing Scale 
Preference satisfaction 
  
GDP, GNP, Household Income and 
Consumption, Stated Satisfaction Surveys 
Quality of Life Human Development Index (capabilities), 
UK’s Office of National Statistics Measure of 
National Well-being, Legatum Prosperity 
Index, Social Progress Index, OECD Better 
Life Index, Nottingham Health Profile, 
Sickness Impact Profile, World Health 
Organization Quality of Life, Health-Related 
Quality of Life 
 
As the table suggests, there is no single agreed way to define or measure well-being. 
Depending on the project and the disciplinary background of researchers, different metrics will 
be adopted. This diversity is amplified when we consider qualitative approaches to well-being 
practiced by anthropologists, some sociologists, journalists, and more generally writers of non-
fiction narratives (Camfield, Crivello and Woodhead 2009; Steinberg 2015). These scholars 
do not typically bring a specific construct of well-being to their projects but instead they 
reconstruct it in conversation with their subjects. Using participant observation and extended 
interviews they unearth the local, culturally specific, and even individual categories that 
characterise good life for people they study. In recognition of these ‘manifest’ well-being 
constructs, we might add an extra row to Table 1: 
Table 2: An additional row to Table 1. 
Definition Measure 
Manifest well-being Conversation, participant observation, 
interviews 
 
The above discussion attributes to the science of well-being a diversity that we shall dub 
‘methodological pluralism’. Such a pluralism is reflected in the large choice of measures and 
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definitions summarized in the tables 1 and 2.  We use the wider adjective ‘methodological’ to 
emphasise the fact that adoption of a particular definition of well-being often brings a distinctive 
methodology, as, for instance, the adoption of a hedonist definition creates the expectation of 
quantitative measurement of psychological states. In attributing methodological pluralism to 
science we do not mean to suggest that scientists actually consciously and intentionally 
endorse this state of affairs. In fact individual scientists typically specialise in a single approach 
to well-being and sometimes even deny the value of the alternatives. Rather methodological 
pluralism is a macro-property of the field as a whole, stemming from its diverse disciplinary 
roots. But this pluralism is fragile and under pressure. 
 
Methodological pluralism is fragile in that it demands a lot from inquirers and there is an 
increasing pressure to scrap it. It demands in particular that researchers thoughtfully and 
consciously identify with a specific tradition and maintain awareness of other traditions they 
could be working in. This explicitly philosophical task does not come easily to scientists. So 
losing some of this diversity would undoubtedly make their work simpler. Indeed, there are 
powerful pressures from outside and from within science, which push scientists to seek greater 
unity. 
 
Pressures towards monism can be identified at three levels: a pressure towards a single 
construct, a pressure towards a single measure of this construct, and finally a pressure 
towards a commonly pursued method.  
 
Why should all researchers adopt the same construct of well-being? On the face of it, it makes 
little sense to insist that one construct of well-being is superior to all others. After all, happiness 
is one thing (an emotional state), broader quality of life is quite another, and claiming that the 
construct of happiness is superior to that of quality of life seems to commit a simple category 
mistake: they are distinct phenomena, each worthy of attention. Nevertheless, one construct 
enjoys far greater popularity and uptake, than others: life satisfaction. Life satisfaction is an 
attitude towards one’s life as a whole and it summarises and aggregates attitudes about 
different spheres of life. In this way it lets people define their well-being however they prefer, 
incorporating whatever considerations they think are relevant.2 When attempting to justify this 
construct, researchers appeal to its simplicity and democratic nature (Diener, Lucas, 
Schimmack and Helliwell 2009, p.47; Layard 2012; Clark, Flèche, Layard, Powdthavee and 
Ward 2018, p.4). Life satisfaction is also psychologically accessible: when people are asked 
how satisfied they are with their life as a whole they have no trouble answering this question 
(Frijters, Clark, Krekel and Layard 2019).  
 
There is considerable debate about the validity of life satisfaction. Critics challenge its 
psychological, normative and psychometric presuppositions—life satisfaction assumes that 
people are able to aggregate a great deal of information about their lives, that this aggregation 
reflects their well-being rather than their culture, and that the data show appropriate 
psychometric properties.3 Despite the long history of these criticisms, life satisfaction has 
 
2 This is also the justification given by defenders of life satisfaction in philosophy (Tiberius and 
Plakias, 2010), though these commentators do not insist that life satisfaction is uniquely superior to all 
other constructs. 
3 For psychological and normative critique see Haybron 2008; for ongoing worries about psychometric 
validity see Deaton and Stone 2016 and replies. 
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shown remarkable tenacity. In our view, this is due to the practical advantages of the approach. 
Life satisfaction is often represented just by one statement such as 'I am satisfied with my life 
as a whole’ which respondents are invited to agree or disagree using a standard Likert scale. 
This single item appears alongside many other questions in big surveys such as the Gallup 
World Poll, the World Happiness Report, WHO’s Health for All, and many other national and 
international datasets. Compared to other much longer questionnaires, these indicators are 
simply too good to pass up from the point of view of busy researchers pressed for time and 
resources. They are straightforward to implement, and generate interesting data that can be 
published and publicised beyond academia. Moreover, they are widely used, creating 
opportunities for cross study comparison and data linkage. In any case, none of the intellectual 
objections raised against these indicators have been able to dislodge them from their dominant 
status. 
 
The strengths and popularity of life satisfaction indicators enable a more deliberate well-being 
monism. If there is a simple unidimensional measure of well-being, then it is possible to build 
a whole science around it—a science of the causes and consequences of this quantity. This 
is the idea behind a common approach to happiness economics. On its standard definition 
expressed by Carol Graham in the influential New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, the goal 
of this field is to estimate an equation where subjective well-being is a quantity on the left-
hand side and the vector of its causes are on the right-hand side: 
 
Micro-econometric happiness equations have the standard form: Wit = α + βxit 
+ εit, where W is the reported well-being of individual i at time t, and X is a 
vector of known variables including socio-demographic and socioeconomic 
characteristics. Unobserved characteristics and measurement errors are 
captured in the error term. (Graham 2008) 
 
This vision of the science of well-being fits well with life satisfaction indicators. Although 
nothing in this picture logically implies that W needs to be life satisfaction rather than some 
other indicator of well-being, the left-hand side requires a single quantity and, apart from 
GDP—which the science of well-being is trying to unseat—life satisfaction is the only practical 
game in town.  
 
Graham’s vision has been taken up by numerous psychologists and economists. The Origins 
of Happiness—a recent book authored by a team of economists who represent the Wellbeing 
Programme of the LSE’s Centre for Economic Performance—is a case in point (Clark, Flèche, 
Layard, Powdthavee and Ward 2018). The authors defend a single, purely quantitative 
methodology, using data from various national and international panel datasets to make fairly 
precise inferences (and even causal inferences) about how much a given set of social, 
demographic, and economic circumstances boosts or impedes life satisfaction. Clark et al. 
carefully compile tables of coefficients designed to demonstrate, to the extent that the 
evidence permits, the causal strength of each factor that personal choices or policy can 
control. These coefficients become the evidence base for decisions big and small. Recently, 
this framework was used to evaluate the costs and benefits of releasing the Covid-19 
‘lockdown’ in the UK (Layard, Clark, De Neve, Krekel, Fancourt, Hey and O’Donnell 2020). 
 
We present this vision as an example of a monistic trend because there is an ambition to find 
a single quantitative function (perhaps with coefficients adjusted to different conditions, but 
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still one functional form) that represents the causal structure of well-being to be estimated 
using statistical and experimental data. This trend is motivated, though rarely explicitly, by a 
vision of a neat and internally consistent scientific paradigm in which all scientists work to 
further a single overarching goal using an agreed set of constructs and measures. In addition 
to this vision, monism has strong pragmatic dimensions. It endeavours to work with whatever 
is available and in whatever way that makes it easier to communicate to policy makers and 
other audiences. This monism seeks practicality, coherence, maximal coordination between 
different research projects with an eye on policy relevance.4 This is in contrast, as we shall 
see, to philosophical monism, which is more explicitly motivated by conceptual tidiness. 
2.2 Monism in philosophy 
The study of well-being in philosophy looks different from the sciences. Rather than studying 
determinants of well-being in particular social contexts, philosophers seek a definition of well-
being that picks out all and only instances thereof. Well-being, in philosophy, is typically a 
general, all-things-considered assessment of how things are going for a person. There are 
some notable exceptions to this tendency—philosophers who recognise that well-being can 
be considered from different perspectives, from which different assessments might be 
appropriately made (Griffin 1988, Scanlon 1998, Kagan 1994, Tiberius 2011). But the 
prevailing orthodoxy in philosophy is to find the essence of well-being, and so to give a single, 
general answer to the question ‘What is well-being?’ 
 
Of course, different philosophers give different answers to this question, with different theories 
grounding well-being in different properties: pleasurable affect, fulfillment of desires, or 
partaking in core human activities.5 But all these answers are monist in a central sense: they 
take ‘well-being’ to pick out some unique, determinate and identifiable property or state of 
people or of the world, which remains constant across all contexts. This entails that when we 
correctly identify well-being, we are always picking out the same thing. Typically well-being is 
taken to be what is good for a person all things considered, taking into account life as a whole. 
Some philosophical accounts are monist in a further sense, insofar as the state of well-being 
is always realised in much the same way or by much the same properties or attitudes (Feldman 
2002). Others allow that well-being can be realised in a number of different ways: the specific 
things which make it such that someone has high levels of well-being differ from person to 
person, context to context (Fletcher 2013). Such accounts nonetheless take it that the thing 
that is picked out by the concept of well-being remains constant across people and contexts, 
even if the particulars which constitute it do not. 
 
We propose to characterise well-being monism in philosophy with three commitments: 
i) there is an essence of well-being; 
ii) the concept of well-being is clear and circumscribed; 
iii) any theory of well-being must be general. 
 
4 At a recent OECD conference on well-being, Richard Layard made the strong claim that: “Unless 
you've got a single concept against which you're judging everything, you can't claim to have a 
coherent set of policies” (Layard 2019). In this paper we will contest the idea that coherence requires 
monism—rather, we suggest, conceptual coherence points towards well-being pluralism. 
5 See Crisp 2017 for an up-to-date overview of the key theories and references. 
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These commitments are not often explicitly acknowledged by philosophers who develop and 
hold monist theories of well-being but, we maintain, they nonetheless underpin most 
contemporary accounts. The three commitments are inter-related and should not be thought 
to be totally distinct from one another: the reasons for accepting one may also turn out to be 
reasons for accepting the others. We explore each in turn. 
 
The first commitment is essentialism, which takes well-being to be a singular, identifiable and 
characterisable state or process that is out there in people or in the world to be identified and 
described. Essentialism implies that well-being always picks out the same thing at a sufficiently 
high level of abstraction. We can thus, in theory at least, identify an essence that characterises 
all and only instances of well-being, and so provide a clear definition of well-being which 
applies exhaustively across all contexts. Such an essentialism is likely grounded in a more 
general conceptual essentialism: the view that concepts (or at least some concepts) pick out 
a particular characteristic or set of characteristics which objects or states of affairs can have 
or fail to have (Wilson 2006). Concepts, on this view, are largely constant across time, and 
have a fixed and relatively determinate scope, meaning that applying concepts involves 
apprehending the concept and the objects under consideration, and determining whether the 
objects satisfy its requirements. 
 
Secondly, well-being monists have strong circumscriptionist intuitions. This means that they 
will challenge any instance of usage of ‘well-being’ and related locutions which diverges from 
the sense familiar to philosophers (Alexandrova 2017; Mitchell 2018). The philosophical 
definitions of well-being described in this section clearly do not exhaust the ways in which 
‘well-being’ is invoked in ordinary and technical language. Pace hedonists, ‘well-being’ is 
sometimes—often, even—ascribed on the basis of things other than pleasure or positive 
subjective psychological states, and sometimes denied despite the presence thereof. 
Philosophers who assert monist theories of well-being thus police the boundaries of the 
concept of well-being, circumscribing the ‘correct’ concept and ruling out alternative usage. 
Whenever there are challenges to the definition of well-being, or instances of well-being are 
implied or suggested which do not fit into a given definition, monist philosophers of well-being 
will endeavour explain why they in fact fail to pick out well-being, and perhaps instead pick out 
related or similar concepts (Hawkins 2019). This boundary policing will require an error theory 
to explain why language users may be mistaken about the meaning and reference of ‘well-
being.’ Circumscriptionist intuitions are clearly closely related to the essentialism of monist 
theories: it is because well-being always picks out some unique property or state that 
alternative characterisations of well-being, which appear to pick out different properties, must 
be precluded. Essentialism will not brook much variety in the conceptual diversity of well-
being. 
 
Thirdly, monist philosophers of well-being are committed to the generality of their theories.  
This captures the idea that, rather than just considering some aspect or area of life, any theory 
of well-being must be formulated at a maximally general level. Different people leading 
radically different lives may be pursuing legitimately different visions of well-being but a single 
general theory identifies the key features of it. This preference for generality is, perhaps, more 
a matter of plausibility than a deep requirement of monism: if well-being picks out a single 
unique and characterisable property of things, it would be peculiar and highly improbable for 
it only to relate to some specific area of or time in people’s lives—for well-being to be an 
assessment of people’s physical health, or an assessment which occurs in childhood or at the 
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end of life. For one thing, the less general the monist definition of well-being, the more difficult 
it will be to come up with a convincing error theory about mistaken ascriptions of well-being. 
2.3 Theoretical friction 
We have argued that there are monistic ideals in both science and philosophy. In science, 
monism seeks a single construct and a single measure of well-being, aiming to estimate a 
single well-being function to which all research should contribute. In philosophy, monism 
means a pursuit of a single general theory of well-being. There are obviously important 
differences between these stances. Much research in the well-being sciences does not purport 
to have found the single, correct theory of well-being. Incentives in sciences are different from 
philosophy and scientists spend less time insisting on the correctness of their paradigm over 
all overs and more time on putting it to work. When scientists show a measure of well-being 
to be valid, this does not automatically invalidate other measures. Monism in philosophy, on 
the other hand, is the orthodoxy to which there are a few challenges (as we shall see shortly) 
and the modus operandi is more explicitly confrontational: defending your own theory of well-
being means attacking others.  Monism in science is motivated by practical considerations of 
gaining as much public influence for this research and simplifications as are worth the cost. 
Monism in philosophy is grounded in conceptual commitments and the desire for neatness 
and clarity. 
 
The differences between the science and philosophy of well-being suggest some 
complications in the two fields using each others’ findings to enrich their own work. To some 
extent it is possible to map constructs of well-being between philosophy and science: hedonic, 
eudaimonistic, and objective well-being constructs, for instance, can be found in both domains. 
But for monistic philosophers to justify their monistic theoretical claims using evidence from 
the well-being sciences risks overplaying the generalisability of such findings. For while 
evidence about the validity and nature of a hedonic well-being construct may lend support to 
a hedonic theory of well-being, it does not lend support to a circumscribed, general, 
essentialist hedonic theory of well-being. That is, it does not show that hedonic well-being is 
the single true theory of well-being, because the well-being sciences have produced a variety 
of validated, non-hedonic well-being constructs and measures. There is, perhaps, more scope 
for well-being scientists to use philosophical theories of well-being to underpin and justify their 
definitions and measures of well-being. However, if well-being scientists wish to maintain a 
broadly pluralist outlook about the conception and measurement of well-being—that is, if they 
see their measures and constructs as just a part of a bigger, pluralistic picture—they cannot 
use philosophical theories in their intended, monistic form. Of course the moves towards 
monism in well-being science open up the possibility of a more straightforward marriage of the 
science and philosophy of well-being. But the grounds for this depend on the justifiability of 
well-being monism, and of course the justifiability of the particular, monistic conception of well-
being in question. Life satisfaction is not the preferred definition of well-being for most 
philosophers. 
 
Well-being pluralism offers a means to reduce the theoretical friction between the science and 
philosophy of well-being. In the next section, we set out a positive vision of well-being pluralism 
in science and in philosophy, and suggest that there is reason to reject monism and accept 
pluralism in both domains. The ideal of pluralism will look different for sciences and for 
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philosophy—we highlight methodological reasons for the well-being sciences to adopt a 
pluralistic outlook and conceptual reasons for the philosophy of well-being to do the same. In 
section 4, however, we go on to argue that both spheres have a lot to learn from one another’s 
reasons for pluralism. 
3 Pluralism 
Pluralism is a stance that endorses the coexistence of two or more entities or processes, and 
denies that they can be reduced to one another or to some third entity or process. Well-being 
pluralism is, broadly, the idea that well-being is in some sense plural, and irreducibly so. To 
make this idea more informative we articulate what pluralism might look like, first, in the well-
being sciences and, second, in philosophy. In both cases we suggest there are good reasons 
to endorse a form of well-being pluralism. 
3.1 Pluralism in science 
The idea that science can benefit from pluralism of methods, theories, or paradigms became 
commonplace in philosophy of science with the demise of ideals associated with logical 
positivism, most notably the unity of science. This ideal presumed that all worthwhile scientific 
theories will eventually be reduced to the fundamental physics and that all worthwhile scientific 
activities can be inscribed in a single universal method. These plans came under pressure 
when philosophers and historians of science showed a diversity in how scientists conceive of 
and practice their inquiry (Crombie 1995). Some went as far as arguing that theories with 
radically different ontologies co-exist with no prospect of unification (Dupré 1993; Cartwright 
1999). On the tamer side, social epistemologists suggested that a community which pursues 
several approaches at once is better at generating healthy criticism and hence it is safer to 
maintain diverse scientific traditions in case the true one escapes us (Longino 1990). 
‘The pluralist stance’ in science rejects ‘scientific monism’—that is, a search for a unified and 
complete account of the natural world using a single method of inquiry—and embraces 
ineliminable multiplicity of methods and theories, even if this comes at the expense of order 
and consistency (Kellert, Longino, and Waters 2006). Advocates of pluralism insist that the 
fact of plurality in science (a descriptive claim) motivates the attitude of respect for it (a 
normative claim). Recent defenders of scientific pluralism take the stance further and argue 
not only that multiplicity of theories and methods should be respected and monistic ideals 
abandoned; but moreover that we should foster and nurture a plurality of ‘systems of practices’ 
across sciences, actively encouraging parallel development of different scientific cultures, 
rather than merely allowing them to co-exist (Chang 2012). 
In section 2.1 we saw that the current landscape in the sciences of well-being is characterised 
by fragile pluralism with pressures towards monism. Are there reasons, motivated by these 
ideas from philosophy of science, to buttress this fragile pluralism and to resist the pressures 
for monism? Yes, we argue, first for measurement and second for methodology. 
3.1.1 Measurement pluralism 
Tables 1 and 2 illustrate the most visible pluralistic aspect of existing research. Researchers 
interested in keeping track of well-being face a wide array of choices. The first choice is to 
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settle on the relevant construct. As a concept and as a locution, ‘well-being’ does not force on 
us any one particular option in the first column. We defend this idea more fully in section 3.2 
where we discuss conceptual pluralism, but for now let us work with the simple and 
uncontroversial idea that the sheer number of constructs of well-being shows that the field 
implicitly recognises legitimate diversity in definitions of well-being. This is in keeping with 
measurement in social sciences in general: the concepts of interest are often vague and fuzzy 
and yet the social scientists cannot, on pain of irrelevance, replace these concepts with well-
behaved technical terms (Chang and Cartwright 2013). If so, care must be taken when any 
specific sense of well-being is used as a construct in a scientific project. Responsible 
researchers dedicate special attention to articulating the scope of the concept they take to 
represent well-being for their particular purposes. They do so in the methodology or 
introduction sections of research articles when they commit to treating well-being as, say, 
encompassing subjective evaluation of all the relevant aspects of people’s life, or just an 
evaluation of their health state.  
 
Pluralism about constructs of well-being amounts to the idea that the choice of construct when 
studying well-being is not obvious, that there are typically several options open to researchers, 
and that it is better not to eliminate these options. The science of well-being is not improved, 
the pluralist insists, by somehow reducing all the options in the first columns of Tables 1 and 
2 to one. This is the first pluralist commitment. 
 
The second commitment shifts attention to the second column of Tables 1 and 2, which 
summarise the measurement options corresponding to each construct. Even once the 
construct has been chosen, there usually remain several options about how it should be 
measured. Researchers must make a choice between measures that are self-reported and 
objective, between questionnaires and interviews, and about summary and multi-dimensional 
indicators. Once again, there are good reasons here to infer from plurality to pluralism. No 
questionnaire of well-being is superior to all others in every respect. Existing validation 
procedures are able to, at best, weed out measures that are obviously low in reliability and 
other indicators of validity. However they are not able to show obvious and uncontroversial 
superiority of any particular instrument.  
 
There are several reasons for this. First, metrology, at least in the social and medical sciences, 
operates with several distinct facets of validity—content, face, construct, criterion, predictive, 
etc. Even though there are efforts to unify them, it always takes a judgment call to decide 
which of these to prioritise as evidence (Messick 1995). A given questionnaire may perform 
better on some subset of these criteria than on another subset. When this happens, 
considerations of content or face validity can pull against those of construct or predictive 
validities (for example, when an item of a questionnaire is important on theoretical grounds 
but fails to correlate with other items). There is no universal recipe for resolving these tensions 
and different researchers can legitimately arrive at different decisions. Secondly, construct 
validity—the most popular criterion—requires that the measure in question correlates with 
other measures that, according to our background knowledge about the construct, it should 
correlate with and does not correlate with those that it shouldn’t. In this case, validat ion 
involves constructing a coherence framework of indicators and measures relating to well-being 
(Alexandrova 2017). In the absence of criterion validity, there is no gold standard against 
which a measure is tested to determine whether the thing that it measures is well-being or 
something else—rather, part of the assessment that it represents well-being is its coherence 
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with other agreed measures and indicators of well-being. The way that different constructs, 
and different measures of those constructs, are understood to relate to one another takes 
something close to the form of a family resemblance concept. There is no single characteristic 
which is definitive of a valid measure of well-being; what determines whether something is a 
valid measure is how it hangs together with other measures of the same construct. Plurality of 
constructs and measures is thus both a legitimate outcome and a precondition of improvement 
of measurement. 
 
Still, it is no secret that the actual choice of scales is often made on pragmatic grounds of ease 
of access, availability, tractability, and even just familiarity with the questionnaire. 
Researchers’ time and resources are limited and it is unsurprising that these pressures will 
play a role. As a result certain focal points emerge. We have seen in Section 2.1 that there 
are monistic tendencies in this direction and that some small number of indicators emerge as 
winners. In happiness economics this is often life satisfaction, while in the health sciences it 
is health state utility as measured by EQ-5D. But while there are clear winners in such 
popularity contests, they are certainly not uncontroversial when it comes to validity. As we 
already mentioned, life satisfaction does not track emotional well-being, can be vulnerable to 
context effects, and makes implausible psychological assumptions about judgement and 
perception. Its defenders also claim that it is the most democratic and liberal measure, allowing 
people to fill in their own values, rather than using the values of the researchers who, if using 
multiple indicators, have to exercise a value judgment when deciding how to weigh them 
(Clark, Flèche, Layard, Powdthavee and Ward 2018; Layard 2019). But this is a very limited 
sense of ‘democratic’, since when people are asked to rate their life satisfaction there is no 
genuine conversation of what well-being means to them and there is no option for the subjects 
to reject the very idea that life is a good with which one can be satisfied or dissatisfied as with 
a product. Some evidence about folk conceptions of well-being suggests that well-being is not 
understood to be purely subjective (Phillips, Misenheimer and Knobe 2011; Phillips, De 
Freitas, Mott, Gruber and Knobe 2017; Kneer and Haybron 2020).  
 
EQ-5D, which was developed not as a comprehensive instrument, but as a complement to 
other quality of life measures (Brooks and EuroQol Group 1996), has limitations of its own. 
The single aggregate values assigned to health states mask substantial heterogeneity in 
respondents preference ordering, suggesting that a large proportion of people would disagree 
with the overall ordering of health states (Roberts and Dolan 2004). Moreover, there is 
evidence that EQ-5D performs less well as a measure of quality of life with respect to mental 
disorders than physical disorders (Brazier 2010). Such findings suggest that EQ-5D should be 
used with caution, and that there are limitations to its appropriateness as a measure of quality 
of life. Regardless, EQ-5D is overwhelmingly the most popular multi-attribute health state utility 
instrument (Richardson, McKie and Bariola 2011; Wisløff, Hagen, Hamidi, Movik, Klemp and 
Abel 2014). 
 
These criticisms do not diminish the popularity of these measures, but—as suggested in 
Section 2.1—we strongly suspect this is not because researchers fail to recognise these 
problems or have convincing answers to them but rather because they are seductively easy 
to work with: they are widely available through panel datasets and generate a single number 
that can be straightforwardly plugged in into statistical analysis. An additional advantage of 
these popular measures of well-being comes from their very popularity: the more researchers 
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use it, the easier it becomes to compare their data, and the simpler it becomes to establish 
and maintain fruitful scientific communication. 
 
Simplicity, convenience, and entrenchedness of life satisfaction or EQ5D are genuine 
considerations in their favour. It is certainly better to have a science of well-being based on 
them only than no science at all. It is also desirable to have a science that responds quickly to 
new social priorities and, since life satisfaction or EQ5D data are more easily available than 
other data, it is plausible that these indicators be prioritised by researchers. However, these 
pragmatic considerations should not be overstated. We do not typically face a choice between 
using life satisfaction only or else ignoring well-being entirely. A science of well-being based 
merely on data about satisfaction strikes us as hopelessly impoverished. It loses the richness 
of multidimensional indicators, of structured and unstructured interviews, and of 
questionnaires that gauge deeper states such as happiness and flourishing. It forsakes the 
duty, widely acknowledged in this field, to reflect the diversity of human experience (Stiglitz, 
Sen and Fitoussi 2010).  
 
To sum up, measurement pluralism seeks to preserve the variety of well-being constructs and 
measures, as a way of respecting the complexity of well-being and acknowledging uncertainty 
in its measurement and validation. Next we highlight a further pluralist commitment. 
3.1.2.  Methodological pluralism 
While measurement pluralism concentrates on the choice of indicators to gauge the relevant 
construct of well-being, methodological pluralism is broader, encompassing not only what data 
is collected but also how widely it is collected, how it is analysed and what conclusions are 
drawn from it. A methodology is pluralist in this sense when it is based on a recognition that 
in each of these aspects researchers have several plausible options and that using more than 
one approach has distinctive advantages. To make these ideas less vague it is worth returning 
to an example of monist methodology from Section 2.1. 
 
Happiness economics as a field takes as its goal the formulation and estimation of an equation 
on the left-hand side of which is the quantity represented by life satisfaction and on the right-
hand side is the vector of demographic and socioeconomic variables plucked from available 
statistics. Our concern is how much this methodology conceals. We have already seen the 
problems with relying solely on life satisfaction as a measure of well-being, but, in addition to 
this, the very idea that knowledge of well-being amounts to estimating an equation is limited 
and shallow. The first problem is that the variables in the equations are not derived from the 
best available theories about determinants of well-being. Housing, unemployment, poverty, 
and other official statistics, may be convenient and interesting, but if the project is to 
understand causes of well-being, then we need to look deeper and wider. We need models of 
well-being at different scales of analysis recognising the phenomenon at psychological, 
cultural, and social levels. The second problem is that the coefficients attached to the variables 
(even when there are sufficiently fine-grained and valid data to estimate them) do not reveal 
the underlying mechanisms behind the correlations. The econometric analysis on its own is 
insufficient to address these problems and this is where qualitative or mixed-methods are 
necessary. Researchers in these traditions have the tools for uncovering phenomena that are 
often invisible to available statistics. Through interviews and fieldwork they reveal the lives 
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and stories behind the correlations and this knowledge is sorely needed to improve both 
definition of variables and the understanding of mechanisms (Singh and Alexandrova 2020, 
Illari 2011). 
 
The above is a case for combining methods, but another form of methodological pluralism is 
to foster research programs based on distinct philosophical assumptions. For instance, 
pluralist considerations would support enabling the parallel running of traditional happiness 
economics, alongside happiness sociology, happiness anthropology, happiness psychology, 
or any combination of these, and so on. Just as there is no pragmatic case for reducing all 
constructs and measures of well-being to one, there is no pragmatic case for organising the 
science of well-being around any particular model, whether from economics or from 
psychology. Compromises between validity and practicality are real and legitimate. But if these 
compromises mean that well-being research has to fit one mould, this is too high of a price to 
pay.  
 
To take stock, pluralism about the science of well-being is committed to diversity of constructs, 
measures, and methods. It need not endorse the stronger forms of pluralism that appeals to 
fundamental disunity of nature. Rather pluralists recognise distinct epistemic cultures around 
well-being and cherish them because they reveal different aspects of well-being and because 
there is much uncertainty about which is the most fruitful. 
3.2 Pluralism in philosophy 
In this section we set out two ways in which a philosophy of well-being can be pluralist. The 
first we call constitutive pluralism. As briefly mentioned in section 2, many monist theories of 
well-being are pluralist in an attenuated sense: while well-being refers to a particular, 
identifiable state, it can be constituted by several different properties or objects. The second 
we call conceptual pluralism. This is a more radical form of pluralism, which is inconsistent 
with the three commitments of philosophical well-being monism which we set out in section 
2.2. Conceptual pluralism about well-being entails that there is no single essence which 
characterises all and only instances of well-being. Instead, there are many different, 
inconsistent concepts of well-being, which are appropriately invoked in different contexts and 
at different times. 
3.2.1 Constitutive pluralism 
Constitutive pluralism captures the idea that well-being is made up of multiple, irreducible 
components. There are a number of different ways in which well-being might be constitutively 
plural, and we suggest that most philosophers thinking about well-being are constitutive 
pluralists in some sense. 
 
Objective goods theories of well-being typically take well-being to be constitutively plural, 
specifying a list of goods that contribute to well-being. Take, for example, Guy Fletcher’s 
(2013) list of prudential goods: achievement, friendship, happiness, pleasure, self-respect, 
virtue. We are well off to the extent that we have these goods in our lives. Other goods can 
contribute to our well-being only insofar as they contribute to, or can be understood in terms 
of, a good on the list. These goods are not reducible to one another or to some master value, 
and they are collectively exhaustive of well-being. The ‘constitutive’ relationship between the 
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goods on the list and well-being is non-instrumental. So the presence of the goods in 
someone’s life doesn’t cause them to have higher well-being, rather, their well-being is 
constituted by the goods: they do well because and to the extent that they have them in their 
life. Some hedonist accounts of well-being are constitutively plural insofar as they recognise 
a number of irreducible kinds of pleasure, any of which might at different times and contexts 
constitute well-being (Crisp 2006). So the pluralism of constitutive plurality might sometimes 
involve there being multiple irreducible varieties of the same kind of entity, and sometimes 
several kinds of entity. 
 
Monistic accounts of well-being can struggle to capture the fact that our lives can go well and 
badly in radically different ways. Constitutively plural accounts attempt to capture this by 
setting out a range of contributors to well-being. While many constitutive pluralist accounts 
take well-being to be an overall assessment of a person’s life as a whole, they can also 
recognise the role of context—allowing, for example, that the constitutive elements of well-
being can vary for different people or at different times in a person’s life. Constitutive pluralism 
is well represented in the well-being sciences. Many measures of well-being are multi-
dimensional, distinguishing, for instance, between the emotional and cognitive aspects of well-
being, or resisting converting the different dimensions of well-being to a single summary value. 
  
Many philosophical theories of well-being adopt a constitutive pluralist approach because they 
recognise that monist accounts of well-being end up in sticky situations. Insisting that well-
being is always and only constituted by one good (e.g. pleasure, desire, happiness) comes 
into conflict with core intuitions about well-being or linguistic applications of well-being. If well-
being is always and only constituted by the satisfaction of our desires, then why don’t we think 
that the heroin addict’s desire for his next fix is good for him? If well-being is always and only 
constituted by our being happy, then why do we think that the pursuit of demanding, frustrating, 
laborious projects can be central to our well-being? Monistic views can insist that someone is 
doing well or badly when they clearly aren’t, on the grounds that their lives do not contain a 
particular monistic prudential feature. The idea is, then, that there must be something other to 
well-being than these single goods if we are to make sense of the ordinary scope of the 
concept of well-being.6 
  
As mentioned in section 2.2, constitutive pluralism about well-being is compatible with a form 
of well-being monism. Constitutive pluralists about well-being need not suggest that well-being 
means different things in different contexts and for different people, but rather that well-being 
comprises a plurality of things. Something similar might be said about other concepts that are 
both descriptive and evaluative, like beauty, courage or justice. In all cases, there is something 
relatively determinate which these concepts pick out, but the properties through which the 
concept is manifested may be quite different across contexts. So constitutive pluralism about 
well-being is not necessarily anti-essentialist. 
 
6 Well-being monism can, perhaps, be thought of as an instance of value monism, and the 
attractiveness of constitutive pluralism about well-being for many philosophers can be understood in 
light of this. Critics of value monism argue that common sense and empirical research suggests that 
we value lots of different things, and attempts to subsume all of our values and all of the objects of 
value under a single ‘supervalue’ fail to capture the complexity, conflict and incommensurability that 
characterises moral decision-making (Stocker 1990; Thomson 1997; Tiberius 2008). Constitutive 
value pluralism may be more or less monistic, depending on the extent to which it takes different 
bearers of value to share in some substantive property of ‘goodness’. 
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However, the constitutive pluralist does recognise a gap between the high-level definition of 
well-being and the ways in which it is realised and specified in particular contexts—even if 
there is an identifiable essence of well-being, this doesn’t exhaust what can be said about 
well-being in different contexts, and we might need quite a number of different tools for 
identifying and measuring well-being. Recognising the complexity and diversity in the 
manifestation of well-being introduces some ambiguity in the application of the concept of well-
being. In order to know whether someone is doing well or not, we need to know not just what 
the essence of well-being is, but whether that essence is realised by the constitutive elements 
of well-being in this instance. This puts some pressure on the essentialist commitment. The 
high-level definition of well-being which remains the same across contexts provides only some 
information about how to identify and comprehend well-being in particular cases. So 
understanding the concept of well-being in any given case involves contextual knowledge and 
interpretation as well as general theoretical knowledge. 
3.2.2 Conceptual pluralism 
Conceptual pluralism is a more radical form of philosophical pluralism than constitutive 
pluralism. It entails that there are multiple competing concepts of well-being which are 
appropriately invoked in different contexts. Conceptual pluralism about well-being has been 
defended by philosophers under the banner of ‘contextualism.’ All versions of well-being 
contextualism share the core claim that the meaning of well-being is always indexed to a 
context (Darwall 2002, Campbell 2016, Alexandrova 2017, Mitchell 2018). Depending on facts 
about the person whose well-being is under consideration, the environment in which well-
being is being assessed, and the purposes of the person or people making the assessment, 
different concepts of well-being are appropriate. For contextualists, the indicators that 
someone is doing well—the things that are relevant and irrelevant to well-being—and the 
thresholds for doing well and badly can differ across contexts. Different concepts of well-being 
might share some core common content or function but this commonality is at a high level of 
abstraction and doesn’t exhaust the meaning of well-being. While different instances of well-
being likely share some characteristics with one another, there is no definitive list of 
characteristics determinative of well-being. The overall concept of ‘well-being,’ for 
contextualists, is thus relatively thin. 
 
On this view, finding a single essence of well-being which runs through all of these diverse 
conceptions is a fool’s errand. While contextualists recognise that there are some global 
concepts of well-being—which, for example, seek to define a concept of well-being for human 
beings in general—these are not superior to more localised concepts on account of having a 
broader remit. In fact, like more localised concepts, global concepts are appropriate only for 
particular purposes. Contextualism about well-being denies that different concepts of well-
being are merely fragments of an overarching concept, such that when concatenated they 
give us a full picture of a person’s well-being. Many local concepts of well-being will be 
inappropriately applied to many people: concepts of child well-being, end-of-life well-being, 
disease-specific well-being, and so on, only make sense when used with particular people, in 
appropriate contexts. 
 
The way that well-being is understood in the well-being sciences is suggestive of conceptual 
pluralism. Depending on whether well-being is being defined and measured by and for 
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clinicians, psychologists, economists or public policy professionals, conceptual pluralist takes 
it to consist in different factors and characteristics. The construct of well-being used by a 
palliative care nurse to assess the well-being of his patients may hardly overlap at all with the 
construct of well-being used by an urban planner to assess the impact of her plans and policies 
on citizens’ well-being. To invoke factors from the urban planning construct in the palliative 
care context would be incongruous, perhaps even unintelligible, and wouldn’t help to expand 
or improve the nurse’s understanding of his patient’s well-being. Even when their assessments 
incorporate general measures of well-being, these are likely to differ depending on contextual 
factors—the palliative care nurse might be more likely to use a general measure of hedonic 
well-being or life satisfaction, whereas the urban planner might be better served by an 
objective measure, which takes into account access to parks, public services, sports facilities, 
and so on. Different contexts may, then, use genuinely localised as well as locally-appropriate 
general well-being constructs. Conceptual pluralism about well-being thus captures something 
of the conceptual variety that characterises technical and non-technical invocations of well-
being. 
 
Monistic and constitutive pluralist conceptions of well-being typically take the scope of the 
concept of well-being to be a person’s whole life or their whole life at the time of consideration. 
That is, well-being for these philosophers is an assessment of how well someone’s life is going 
all things considered. In the spirit of circumscription they deny that many localised concepts 
of well-being are definitions of well-being at all, instead capturing well-being but adjacent or 
related concepts, such as happiness, health, or psychological functioning. At best the localised 
concepts are understood to capture fragments of the concept of well-being. For the conceptual 
pluralist this is futile. The palliative care nurse doesn’t know more about his rural-dwelling, 
retired patient’s well-being if he also assesses her urban-development-related-well-being, her 
workplace-related-well-being, her neo-natal well-being, and so on. These other localised 
assessments of well-being are context inappropriate. Moreover, to draw categorical 
conceptual lines between well-being and closely related concepts fails to recognise that 
sometimes well-being is constituted, or partly constituted, by health, life satisfaction, pleasure, 
and so on, so this cluster of concepts are not just inter-related but inter-defined. 
 
For the conceptual pluralist, to deny that many localised definitions of well-being are concepts 
of well-being at all, and to insist that only general whole-person or whole-life concepts capture 
well-being in its fullness artificially constrains the ordinary usage of the concept of well-being. 
To claim that a tool for measuring well-being is in fact a measure of happiness or of 
psychological functioning when it is designed and understood as a measure of well-being is 
to engage in a form of conceptual policing without a clear justification. It is not clear that 
philosophers should get the final say on what can be called ‘well-being’—though they can 
certainly add their own concepts of well-being to the mix and see whether anyone finds them 
plausible. 
3.3 The global and the local 
So how radical is conceptual pluralism? In this section we take the opportunity to correct 
possible misconceptions about this view, in particular the worry that it might go too far in 
privileging the local over the global concepts of well-being. 
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If well-being pluralists deny that there is a single essence which runs through all conceptions 
of well-being, then it’s reasonable to ask why we need to retain an overarching concept of 
‘well-being’ at all. Perhaps it is content-free and needs to be eliminated. We do not take this 
route. Well-being pluralism is consistent with there being some very general shared content 
to all well-being uses—something relating, perhaps, to how someone is doing or faring. 
However, this content is too limited to specify the content of each contextual well-being 
ascription. Making an ascription of well-being requires substantive specification of a concept 
of well-being which sets out the conditions under which someone can be understood to be 
doing well or badly. And furthermore, the conceptual content shared by all uses of well-being 
is too thin to pick out only instances of well-being—how someone is doing or faring can refer 
to aspects of them or their life other than their well-being.  
 
Many linguistic communities, notably the contemporary Anglophone one, do in fact use term 
‘well-being’ to group together a number of different constructs. But whenever well-being is 
invoked or ascribed in practice, additional substantive conceptual content is appended to this 
thin concept of well-being to develop specific general or local concepts of well-being. 
Philosophers have attempted to flesh out an acontextual concept of well-being and to use it 
for various theoretical purposes. If, and to the extent to which, their concepts work for these 
purposes, we see no problem in retaining some overarching concept of well-being. But for 
practical purposes such acontextual concepts are simply not sufficient. They will not enable 
us to understand whether and when someone is doing well, and how well they are doing—
and so will not allow us to pick out well-being and to make well-being ascriptions in practice. 
 
Those with prudentially monistic inclinations might contend that an objective list theory of 
well-being makes better sense of the relationship between the central concept of well-being 
and contextual invocations and ascriptions of it. As we noted in Section 3.2.1, objective list 
theories are sensitive to a certain amount of contextual variation in the meaning and nature 
of well-being, whilst defending a relatively substantive conceptual core which is shared by all 
contextual variants. Many objective list theories of well-being specify a short, finite list of 
things which comprise well-being (knowledge, friendship, happiness, achievement, health, 
practical reason, self-respect). According to objective list theories of well-being, any 
ascription of well-being must reflect the goods on the list—which of them are present in 
someone’s life, in what combination, and to what extent. For the objective list theorist, both 
the urban planner and the palliative care nurse will need to consider the presence of the 
same basic goods in the lives of their patients or the citizens affected by their work—their 
health, friendship, happiness, self respect, and so on—although these goods will be to some 
extent differently realised in each case. 
 
According to our taxonomy, objective list theories are constitutively plural. But the discussion 
at the end of section 3.2.1 suggests that there is actually relatively little space between 
constitutive pluralism and conceptual pluralism as we understand them. If the objective list 
theorist must specify the meaning and nature of each of the goods on the list in each context 
of application—what ‘friendship,’ ‘health,’ ‘happiness’ and so on mean for the palliative care 
patient and the citizen—then there remains significant substantive conceptual content in 
contextual well-being constructs which is not included in the overarching concept of well-
being. The difference between this account of well-being and our conceptually pluralist 
approach might best be understood to come down to differences in how substantive the 
overarching concept of ‘well-being’ is—that which remains constant across contexts. 
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More obviously monistic objective list theories with short lists of goods that are narrowly 
defined and include strict rules of application are, we think, likely to be relatively 
unconvincing as theories of well-being. Inevitably some degree of massage and 
manipulation will be required to explain how the same highly specified goods (exhaustively) 
comprise well-being in all contexts. More permissive objective list theories will, for example, 
allow goods to come under different descriptions in different contexts, take some goods to 
be irrelevant to well-being in certain circumstances, and adopt long or open ended lists of 
goods. While more likely to be able to accommodate enough flexibility to capture a wide 
variety of contextual well-being constructs, these start to look less monistic and more 
conceptually plural, insofar as the overarching well-being concept must become increasingly 
thin in order to harbour appropriate diversity.  
 
More nuanced objective list theories include Guy Fletcher’s defence of what he calls 
aspectualism about well-being—the view that in different contexts we are interested in 
different aspects of well-being (Fletcher 2019). General assessments of well-being, for 
Fletcher, capture well-being proper, and will consider a person’s overall well-being, taking 
into account particular aspectual assessments. Amartya Sen takes well-being to consist in 
the achievement of functionings, that is, activities and states of existence which capture how 
a person can function (Sen 1985). For Sen, prudentially relevant functionings comprise a 
large and unconstrained set, which can be broad or narrow and can come under overlapping 
descriptions. On his account, different sets of functionings, under different descriptions, will 
be relevant for well-being in different contexts. The overarching concept of well-being in such 
accounts is very thin. It can perhaps be best understood as a conjunction or disjunction of 
different contextual well-being constructs (some of which are very localised and some of 
which more general) rather than adding much or any substantive conceptual content. When 
the list of potential contextual well-being constructs is open ended, it’s difficult to see how 
this differs meaningfully from our pluralist account. 
 
In summary, we do not deny or eliminate the overarching concept of well-being. Rather we 
maintain that, to the extent that this exists, it is conceptually thin and needs substantive 
specification in order for it to be used to make well-being ascriptions in practice. We 
understand there to be relatively little space between our conceptual pluralism and 
sufficiently nuanced objective list theories. There seems to be little reason to insist that the 
latter are conceptually monist, as the extent to which they specify an essence which runs 
through all instances of well-being is extremely limited. 
4 Defending pluralism 
So far, we have seen that the applied sciences and philosophy approach the study of well-
being very differently from one another. Their motivations for defining and, in the scientific 
case, for measuring well-being produce not only divergent definitions, but also different (often 
implicit) conceptions of the kind of thing that well-being is. The diverse, localised searches for 
context-specific measures of well-being in the sciences have led to contingent pluralism. The 
search for a single, essentialist definition of well-being by philosophers has led them to 
principled anti-pluralism about well-being. We have argued that, despite the pragmatic 
arguments for a move towards monism in the science of well-being, there is in fact a strong 
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methodological basis for well-being pluralism. Moreover, despite the resolute monism of much 
philosophy of well-being, we have argued that there is a conceptual basis for well-being 
pluralism. In this section we go further, arguing that both the well-being sciences and the 
philosophy of well-being would benefit from recognising one another’s reasons to be pluralist: 
philosophy should recognise the methodological reasons, and science the conceptual 
reasons, for well-being pluralism. 
 
First, then, there is reason for the well-being sciences to recognise conceptual pluralism about 
well-being. In the previous section we suggested that the pragmatic considerations for moving 
towards well-being monism in the science of well-being are limited. Though there are 
potentially strong reasons of convenience for using the same measure across different 
contexts, and for preferring simple, easy-to-use measures, convenience only goes so far. In 
particular, reasons relating to convenience do not pass much muster when the validity of 
measures is questionable. Assessing construct validity, for example, requires prior knowledge 
of the construct in question—in this case, well-being. This prior knowledge can’t just come 
from other validated measures of well-being, or at least, insofar as it does, these other 
measures must be grounded in some externally acquired knowledge about well-being. In other 
words, we need some prior, conceptually coherent account of what well-being is in order to 
know whether we are measuring it correctly (McClimans and Browne 2011; Alexandrova 
2017).  
 
Theoretical reasoning about well-being can provide at least part of this background 
knowledge. Philosophical concepts of well-being set out, in relatively broad terms, what kind 
of a thing well-being is and how to recognise it, offering a standard against which to assess 
the relevance of potential indicators of well-being. If we are right to think that there are strong 
reasons for philosophers to favour conceptual pluralism about well-being, then these reasons 
should be recognised as such by those situated within the well-being sciences who are 
seeking to develop valid measures of well-being. Of course, in one sense, recognition of the 
conceptual plurality of well-being makes the task of validating a well-being construct somewhat 
more difficult: if there are multiple different possible concepts of well-being at play, then there 
will not be a single, clear theoretical construct against which to compare measures. 
Conceptual pluralism about well-being implies that more theoretical work needs to be done 
upfront to determine the appropriate conception of well-being for the measurement context 
and well-being subjects under consideration. It also suggests that mere absence of strong 
correlation of one well-being measure with others need not undermine its validity. If there is 
good reason to think that they each measure different concepts of well-being, then they may 
diverge in core ways. 
 
Secondly, there is reason for philosophers to take on board pluralism of the sciences. We 
have argued that there are good reasons to be a constitutive pluralist about well-being, which 
are accepted by many if not most philosophers thinking about well-being. However, we also 
suggested that constitutive pluralism opens up a gap between the high-level definition of well-
being and its manifestation in particular contexts. Determining what well-being means in a 
particular context and assessing the level of someone’s well-being involves reference to 
something other than the central definition of well-being. In particular it requires reference to 
the multiple possible goods that might be constitutive of well-being, and some assessment as 
to the presence or absence of these. In short, any contextual identification of well-being is 
going to require some kind of measurement. This might be measurement in a very limited 
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sense—identifying the presence or absence of some object, for example, or ordering a set of 
actual and potential states without specifying any intervals between them—but it nonetheless 
involves more than merely theoretical, definitional work. This central position that 
measurement occupies in thinking philosophically about well-being suggests that philosophers 
must take the practice of measuring well-being seriously. And if, as we have argued, there are 
good reasons for adopting measurement and methodological pluralism about well-being, then 
these reasons also apply to philosophers trying to acquire knowledge of well-being. Of course, 
what such ‘epistemic’ pluralism about well-being means for philosophers is going to be slightly 
different in the details from what it means for well-being scientists—philosophers are not 
typically in the business of surveying people or collecting scientific data, for instance. For 
philosophers, epistemic pluralism might entail an openness to the different possible ways of 
characterising someone’s life and its objects in order to make assessments of well-being, as 
well as consideration of the different perspectives from which such a characterisation might 
be made. Epistemic pluralism suggests that, even once a given well-being concept has been 
determined to be appropriate for a particular context, there will be different ways of applying 
it, which might lead to different contextual assessments of well-being. 
 
So, both well-being scientists and philosophers should pay attention to the reasons each other 
have for being pluralists about well-being. This is, perhaps, unsurprising, especially if we 
conceive of well-being scientists and philosophers as trying—at some level—to do the same 
thing: to say something useful and true about what well-being is and how to come to know it. 
In the remainder of this section, we will suggest that there might be less distance between the 
principled and methodological reasons for being a pluralist about well-being than our 
arguments thus far have supposed, setting the stage for a more joined up science and 
philosophy of well-being.  
 
A full-blooded conceptual pluralism, of the kind we set out in the previous section, goes hand-
in-hand with a rejection of the essentialist theory of concepts with which we characterised 
philosophical well-being monism. In contrast to this essentialism—which sees concepts as 
relatively stable, determinate, and providing necessary and sufficient conditions for their own 
application—a non-essentialist account of concepts takes them to be much more 
indeterminate and requiring contextual specification in order to determine their scope and 
meaning (Wilson 2006). Concepts, on this non-essentialist view, don’t take the form of clear 
and abstract definitions, but rather must be understood in relation to their application. And 
moreover, this application is typically messy, with appropriate usage of concepts changing 
over time and exhibiting variation over different linguistic and social contexts. On such a non-
essentialist view of concepts, coming to understand the nature of a concept like well-being 
necessarily involves careful attention to the diversity of ways in which it is used and entreats 
us not to look upon variation in use as a concerning or unusual feature. 
 
Part of the motivation for conceptual pluralism comes from a concern to take at face value the 
apparent conceptual variation in the way that well-being is used and ascribed. Of course, 
looking carefully at the way that the concept of well-being is used as a means of coming to 
understand the concept, and as a means of criticising essentialist definitions thereof, already 
calls into question the essentialist approach. So, the argument for conceptual pluralism should 
be seen as presenting an alternative to, rather than a knock-down critique of, the kind of 
philosophical monism that we set out in section 2. But if taking seriously the actual scope and 
expression of well-being seems like a sensible approach to thinking about the meaning of the 
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concept, then the wide variation exhibited both in ordinary language and technical contexts 
suggests that there are reasons to be conceptually pluralist about well-being. And these 
reasons are both principled and pragmatic in nature, because a non-essentialist account of 
concepts suggests that our theoretical development of concepts must look out towards actual 
usage in order for definitional content to be meaningful. This doesn’t have to mean that 
attempts to define well-being can’t engage in any circumscription of conceptual boundaries at 
all, nor that they can’t be critical of particular usages of the concept. But it does suggest that 
such critique can’t take place in abstraction from, and without paying close attention to, actual 
usage and its variation. 
 
So what does this mean in practice for the philosophy and science of well-being? First, it 
suggests that pragmatic and methodological considerations about the meaning and 
measurement of well-being, such as the richness and diversity of its application, the variety of 
possible approaches to the characterisation and analysis of the putative indicators of well-
being, and epistemic uncertainty around making assessments of well-being should be central 
to conceptual theorising about well-being. These are features which come with the territory of 
seeking to define a complex, normative, social concept, not idiosyncrasies to be abstracted 
away. And it also suggests that the theoretical constructs that the well-being sciences draw 
on in order to develop and validate measures of well-being can’t be generated entirely 
separately from the practice of using and thinking about well-being. This doesn’t mean that 
the well-being sciences can do away with theoretical concepts of well-being: theoretical 
concepts of well-being don’t just describe or report well-being usage, but interpret, 
characterise and generalise about it. This brings the science and philosophy of well-being 
much closer together and envisages them as-- reflectively engaged in a shared practice of 
theorising about, describing and measuring well-being. 
5 Conclusion 
The well-being sciences and the philosophy of well-being have historically approached the 
study of well-being very differently. These differences make it difficult for philosophers and 
scientists thinking about well-being to use one another’s scholarship to inform or augment their 
own. Failure to recognise underlying conceptual differences between the two fields risks using 
philosophical arguments or scientific evidence about well-being in ways which do not 
adequately reflect their motivations or appropriate scope of their application. We have 
suggested that moving towards a considered pluralism in both domains will allow some of this 
tension to be resolved, and enable science and philosophy to integrate empirical and 
theoretical work in a constructive and conceptually coherent manner. The reward is not only 
inter-disciplinary progress. The reasons to be a well-being pluralist extend beyond pragmatic 
considerations and conceptual coherence. Well-being monism, whether as a methodological 
or theoretical commitment, fails to recognise the conceptual complexity of well-being and the 
substantial epistemic uncertainty surrounding its identification and measurement. There are 
independent methodological and conceptual reasons for endorsing well-being pluralism within 
both philosophy and the sciences. 
 
Our defence of well-being pluralism is not merely an intellectual exercise; how well-being is 
understood and treated as an object of study has wide-ranging and hefty consequences. Since 
measures of well-being are increasingly used in healthcare and public policy, as a tool for 
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distributing resources and aiding judgements which profoundly affect our individual and 
collective lives, the inclination towards monism in the well-being sciences becomes positively 
dangerous. The move towards fewer and simpler tools for the characterisation and 
measurement of well-being risks underestimating its complexity and variability. In relying on 
public authority of simple quantification, monism overstates the certainty of our knowledge. As 
the potential effects of mistaken, unfair or unrepresentative assessments of well-being grow 
more and more consequential, it is increasingly imperative to be sensitive to the dangers of 
over-simplification. We urge well-being scientists to avoid inadvertently endorsing a form of 
well-being monism by choosing well-being approaches and measures on tempting but 
ultimately limited pragmatic grounds. And we urge philosophers to connect their theoretical 
work about well-being to the urgent questions which are occasioned by the sciences and by 
the invocation of well-being in public policy and public life. Delivering theoretically and 
methodologically nuanced data and analysis to support these demanding public roles requires 
both scientists and philosophers, working together, to embrace a pluralistic outlook and to 
avoid lure of pragmatic shortcuts and conceptual tidiness. 
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